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I. Introduction 
System-wide, the United Nations is pushing to strengthen the rule of law, promoting 
transparency, good governance, and accountability at the national and international levels. 2 
Consistent with that direction, a UN body, the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL” or the “Commission”) has launched an effort to move from being a 
barrier to transparency to a facilitator of it. 
 
In 2008, recognizing that investor–State arbitrations have a different need for transparency 
than purely commercial arbitrations between private parties, the Commission “agreed by 
consensus on the importance of ensuring transparency in investor–State dispute settlement,”3 
and directed Working Group II, its working group with expertise in international arbitration, to 
develop “as a matter of priority” a legal standard reflecting that policy decision.4 At subsequent 
sessions in 2011 and 2012, the Commission “reaffirmed the importance of ensuring 
transparency in treaty-based investor–State arbitration” and urged the Working Group to push 
its work on that issue to completion.5 The Working Group is now two years into that effort.6 
Reports of the Working Group’s progress, however, reveal questions regarding whether the 
Working Group’s final product will be consistent with the mandate from the Commission and 
the broader UN push to deepen transparency, or whether it will resist that movement, and seek 
to entrench the status quo under which investors, States, and arbitrators would have wide 
latitude to keep disputes closed off from the public view.  
 
In this context, the outcome of the discussions relating to the scope of application of the new 
transparency rules will be of particular relevance. If those discussions result in limiting the 
application of the rules such that they do not apply to disputes under the roughly 3,000 treaties 
that currently exist, the new rules will do little to actually contribute to increased transparency. 
This could lead to rules that are state of the art in terms of content and form, but that are in 
reality largely irrelevant because not applicable to the majority of investment disputes.  
 
In light of the crucial stage the Working Group is at in terms of implementing its mandate from 
the Commission to ensure transparency in investor-State arbitration, this paper hopes to clarify 
what tools are available to the Working Group to achieve that goal. In order to put the Working 
Group’s efforts in context, the paper provides an overview of how UNCITRAL’s arbitration rules 
can and do impact the public’s ability to access information regarding investor–State 
arbitrations. The paper then takes stock of the Working Group’s progress in the four meetings 
before its session in October 2012. It describes proposed revisions to the form and content of 
                                                          
2 Delivering Justice: Programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels, Report of the 
Secretary-General (2012), A/66/749. 
3 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 41st session (June 16–July 3, 2008), Gen. Ass. 63rd 
session, supp. No. 17, A/63/17, para. 314.  
4 Id. 
5 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 45th session (June 25–July 6, 2012), Gen. Ass. 67th 
session, supp. No. 17, A/67/17, para. 69. 
6 The Working Group began work on the issue of transparency in treaty-based investor–State arbitration at its 53rd 
session, held in Vienna in October 2010. 
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the procedural rules, the disclosures they would require, and the exceptions they would allow. 
It addresses some open issues and areas of uncertainty at the time of the October 2012 session, 
and also identifies how proposed changes align with current practices regarding disclosure. The 
paper then examines in more detail the circumstances in which those changes would apply to 
future investor–State disputes. It discusses, on the one hand, proposals to narrow such 
application and, on the other, to facilitate it. Finally, the paper also addresses options for 
moving the effort to ensure transparency in investor–State arbitration beyond the context of 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules through creation of an international convention on the issue. 
 
II. The Impact of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on the Openness of 
     Investor–State Disputes 
 
In their investment treaties, States offer investors the option to take disputes arising under the 
treaties to international arbitration. When doing so, States generally condition or limit their 
offers to arbitrate by saying that when investors do pursue investment arbitration, they must 
do so in accordance with certain procedural rules. States commonly offer investors a menu of 
rules to choose from, which may include the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, the arbitration rules of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or ICSID’s Additional 
Facility,7 the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the 
arbitration rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). Some treaties widen their 
menus further by saying that, in the context of a particular dispute, the investor and the 
respondent State may agree to develop their own rules on a purely ad hoc basis, or to modify 
the provisions of the UNCITRAL, ICC or other existing arbitration rules. 
 
Under this arrangement, States set the outer limits of the options for arbitration rules in their 
treaties. Investors, though bounded by the limits set in the treaty, have the ability to determine 
which option will actually apply. Although the investor and respondent State may (depending 
on the language of the treaty, applicable rules, and relevant domestic law) be able to agree to 
modify or supplement all or some of the rules selected, it is the investor that has the privileged 
position of being able to choose the procedural regime that will actually govern the dispute. 
Within the regime selected, the tribunal also generally has power to determine procedural 
issues not addressed in the rules or settled by the parties. 
 
This system makes achieving the goal of “ensuring transparency in investor–State arbitration” 
complex. In essence, there are only two approaches through which States can “ensure” 
                                                          
7 Pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID Convention), ICSID only has jurisdiction over disputes between nationals of one Contracting State and another 
Contracting State. ICSID, however, also has an Additional Facility that can administer certain arbitrations that would 
otherwise be excluded from the scope of ICSID jurisdiction, such as arbitrations when only one disputing party is a 
national of a Contracting State or a Contracting State. These disputes are not governed by the ICSID Convention and the 
standard ICSID arbitration rules, but are governed by a separate set of rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. The ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules are very similar to the standard ICSID arbitration rules for disputes also falling under the ICSID 
Convention.  
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transparency. The first is for States to include provisions directly in their treaties making 
transparency obligatory. A small but diverse and growing number of States uses this first 
approach.8  
 
The second is for States to only offer to arbitrate disputes under arbitration rules that require 
transparency. At present, this approach is only a theoretical option, as no set of arbitration 
rules mandate transparency throughout the arbitration proceedings.9  
 
The fact that no arbitration rules currently mandate transparency throughout the arbitral 
process is not, however, to say that confidentiality is required in arbitration, much less the 
specific breed of arbitration that is treaty-based investor–State arbitration. Here, the 
background of various sets of procedural rules governing international arbitrations is useful to 
review. The rules frequently governing international arbitration, including treaty-based 
investor–State arbitrations, are, as noted above, the arbitration rules developed by ICSID, 
UNCITRAL, the ICC, and the SCC.  
 
The ICSID arbitration rules, like the ICSID system they were designed to operate within, are the 
only arbitration rules established exclusively for disputes arising between investors and States10 
and in recognition of the fact that resolution of these disputes implicates matters of 
international law relating to the treatment of investments.11 The ICSID system’s specialized 
focus manifests itself in various ways, including its approach to transparency. In particular, 
ICSID’s financial and administrative regulations require the ICSID Secretary-General to make 
publicly available information about  
 
all significant data concerning the institution, conduct and disposition of each 
proceeding, including in particular the method of constitution and the membership of 
each . . . Tribunal and Committee. On the Arbitration Register he shall also enter, with 
respect to each award, all significant data concerning any request for the 
supplementation, rectification, interpretation, revision or annulment of the award, and 
any stay of enforcement.”12  
 
  
                                                          
8 For a survey of the provisions on transparency, see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Lise Johnson, Transparency in 
the Dispute Settlement Process: Country best practices (IISD & CIEL, 2011), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=1529. 
9Even if one option in the menu were to provide for this level of transparency, the investor could then opt for a set of 
arbitration rules that did not similarly require disclosure. The investor may do this in an attempt to specifically avoid 
being subject to the rules on transparency, or in response to other concerns not related to issues of public disclosure.  
10 See, ICSID Convention, Art. 25(1). 
11 ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, Regulation 22 (If both parties to a proceeding consent to the 
publication of: … (b) arbitral awards; or (c) the minutes and other records of proceedings, the Secretary-General shall 
arrange for the publication thereof, in an appropriate form with a view to furthering the development of international law in 
relation to investments.” (emphasis added)). 
12 ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, Regulation 23; see also id., Regulation 22.  
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ICSID’s administrative and financial regulations also require the Secretary-General to publish 
awards if both disputing parties consent to publication. In cases when both parties do not 
consent to publication of the award, the ICSID arbitration rules require ICSID to “promptly 
include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.”13  
 
Apart from the ICSID arbitration rules, the rules used in investor–State arbitrations have largely 
been crafted to apply to commercial disputes between private parties, disputes that generally 
arise from contracts and do not involve issues of public rights or interests. It is therefore not 
surprising that the drafters of these arbitration rules did not incorporate provisions requiring 
transparency, facilitating development of international law, or otherwise attempting to take 
into account public rights and interests raised or touched on by the disputes.  
 
Indeed, most arbitration rules referred to in investment treaties are essentially silent on the 
matter of transparency, neither mandating confidentiality nor requiring disclosure. The rules 
allow the disputing parties significant latitude to determine—individually or through 
agreement—the degree of openness of the proceedings. Restrictions on disclosure, where they 
are present, are primarily directed at the arbitrators and arbitral institutions, not the parties 
themselves.14  
 
Nothing in the SCC, ICC, ICSID, or UNCITRAL arbitration rules, for example, prevents either party 
to the dispute from unilaterally disclosing information regarding the initiation and core of the 
case. Those rules do not preclude either disputing party from releasing the notice of arbitration, 
pleadings, or briefs.15 Thus, there are a number of these documents generated at the 
commencement and during the course of the proceedings that are available in the public 
domain.  
 
The rules of the SCC, ICC and ICSID also permit either disputing party to unilaterally disclose 
orders, decisions, and final awards issued by the tribunal.16 On this issue, the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules stand out as being more restrictive than those other bodies’. Article 32(5) of 
the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules provides that “[t]he award may be made public only with the consent 
of both parties.” Pursuant to this provision, a State must seek and obtain approval from the 
investor to publish an award, and vice versa. The 2010 UNCITRAL Rules are slightly different and 
more liberal toward disclosure. They state in Article 34(5) that “[a]n award may be made public 
with the consent of all parties or where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by 
legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to legal proceedings before a court or 
other competent authority.”  
                                                          
13 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 48(4); Additional Facility Rules, Art. 53(3). 
14 See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 34(2) (“Additional copies certified true by the Secretary General shall be made 
available on request and at any time to the parties, but to no one else.”). 
15 See ICC Arbitrations Rules, Article 22(3) (“Upon the request of any party, the arbitral tribunal may make orders 
concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings … and may take measures for protecting trade secrets and 
confidential information.” There is no default rule of confidentiality). 
16 An exception to this is that the arbitration rules of the ICC state that decisions regarding arbitrator challenges “shall not 
be communicated.” ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 11(4). 
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The one aspect of investor–State arbitrations where the various sets of rules all can generally 
be said to constrain public access is in their treatment of hearings. The rules of ICSID, 
UNCITRAL, the ICC, and the SCC all currently require the consent of both disputing parties for 
hearings to be open to those not involved in the proceedings.17 If those conditions are not met, 
hearings in treaty-based investor–State disputes will only be open when required by the 
underlying treaty.  
 
Thus, with the exception of the rather common restrictions on access to hearings, and the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules’ provisions on disclosure of awards, arbitration rules used in 
investor–State arbitrations do not impose much of a mandatory barrier to public access to 
information and, at least in the case of the ICSID rules, require a certain amount of disclosure. 
Nevertheless, there are restrictions on access to information generated in and about these 
cases. These restrictions derive from two main sources: one, agreements by the parties to keep 
the disputes (or aspects thereof) confidential; and two, orders by the tribunal to bar or restrict 
publication by one or both of the disputing parties. 
 
Some of these agreements and orders aim to prevent disclosure of information commonly 
deemed “confidential,” such as trade secrets or state secrets. These types of agreements and 
orders can be entirely consistent with and are an integral part of transparent regimes. In 
contrast, other confidentiality agreements and orders are broader and more restrictive, closing 
the entirety of the proceedings off to the public view irrespective of whether the information at 
issue would, outside the context of the arbitration, generally be deemed confidential or 
protected. In large part, these agreements of the disputing parties and orders of the arbitral 
tribunal—not arbitration rules or investment treaties—are the instruments that restrict 
transparency of investor–State arbitration.  
 
Canvassing (much less evaluating) the arguments in support of and against transparency in 
investor–State arbitration is outside the scope of this note. Nevertheless, it must be recognized 
that there have been increasing concerns raised that agreements of the disputing parties to 
keep disputes private impinge on the interests and even rights of non-disputing parties, and 
that orders by a tribunal to limit what one or both disputing parties can communicate regarding 
the disputes creates tension between the investor–State arbitration system and the rights and 
obligations of the disputing parties to disclose information. These concerns underlie the 
Commission’s decision on the importance of ensuring transparency in investor–State dispute 
settlement and its mandate to the Working Group reflecting that decision. This brings us to the 
topic of the next section: the efforts of Working Group II and its progress to date.  
  
                                                          
17 See ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 32(2); ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Article 39(2); ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 
26(3); SCC Arbitration Rules, Article 27(3). 
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III. UNCITRAL’s Reform Efforts 
A. Progress on Revisions to the Rules’ Form and Content 
 
In 2006, UNCITRAL formally decided to initiate work on revising and updating the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules, which had not been changed since their adoption in 1976. It tasked Working 
Group II with implementing the effort. At its first meeting after receiving its mandate, the 
Working Group noted that the UNCITRAL arbitration rules were being applied in a variety of 
types of arbitrations, including arbitrations between two States, between an investor and a 
State, and between private, commercial parties. The Working Group considered whether and 
how to take these variations into account when revising the rules, and decided to maintain the 
arbitration rules’ “generic approach” by drafting revisions that would apply to all types of 
arbitrations irrespective of the subject matter or the nature of the parties. The Working Group 
noted early on its work, however, that some situations, including aspects of investor–State 
disputes, might need a separate set of rules or explanatory provisions due to their unique 
features. 
 
During Working Group II’s first biannual meetings dedicated to revising the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules, some participants suggested that the rules be revised or an annex added to 
them so as to ensure transparency in the subset of arbitrations involving States. After much 
discussion, the Working Group concluded that, because investor–State arbitrations differed in 
key respects from ordinary commercial arbitrations, they required distinct regulations on 
certain points, including the issue of transparency. The Working Group also concluded, 
however, that it did not want its work on those issues specific to investor–State arbitration to 
delay completion of the work on the UNCITRAL arbitration rules in their generic form. It thus 
decided to proceed with the general revisions and to ask its governing body, the Commission, 
for instruction on whether and how to proceed on specific issues relating to treaty-based 
investor–State arbitration.  
 
The Commission provided that guidance during its session in June–July 2008. It explicitly 
recognized “the importance of ensuring transparency in investor–State dispute resolution” and 
directed the Working Group to address the topic of transparency “as a matter of priority 
immediately after completion” of general revisions to the Arbitration Rules.18  
 
Working Group II finalized its general revisions to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules at its February 
2010 session and the Commission adopted them that summer. Working Group II then picked up 
the issue of transparency. The Working Group has now had four meetings on the topic of 
ensuring transparency in investor–State dispute settlement and has made substantial progress 
on developing the content of rules that would make these arbitrations more open.  
 
                                                          
18 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 41st session (June 16-July 3, 2008), Gen. Ass. 63rd 
session, supp. No. 17, A/63/17, Para. 314. 
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1. Rules on Disclosure and Openness  
 
Support has coalesced around a number of proposals for increasing transparency. One is for a 
rule explicitly giving the tribunal authority to allow participation from amicus curiae. Another is 
for a rule that would require (subject to certain exceptions, which are discussed below) 
disclosure of specific categories of documents produced throughout the course of the 
proceedings. Types of documents that have been among the more popular candidates for this 
list include the notice of arbitration, briefs submitted by the parties, submissions by non-
disputing parties, witness statements, expert reports, transcripts of hearings, and orders, 
decisions and awards issued by the tribunal. The issue of exhibits is more contentious, however, 
as various delegations have expressed concerns about the burdens and costs associated with 
what, in some cases, could be a voluminous set of materials and information. Nevertheless, for 
materials such as exhibits that may not be included in the list of documents subject to 
mandatory disclosure, many in the Working Group have supported a proposal stating that the 
tribunal would have the authority to order their publication upon its own motion, a request by 
a party, or a request by a non-party.19 Another topic on which there seems to be broad 
agreement is the matter of non-derogability. Customary in arbitration rules is a provision 
allowing the disputing parties to agree to modify some or all of the rules. In the context of rules 
on transparency, however, there has been wide support for a provision that would prevent the 
disputing parties from agreeing to deviate from the rules on transparency, but would allow the 
tribunal some flexibility in applying those rules.20 
 
Some aspects of transparency have been generating more resistance or trepidation in the 
Working Group than others.21 For one, there has been concern regarding rules mandating 
disclosure of notices of arbitration prior to constitution of the tribunal. Delegations have 
worried that without a tribunal in place there would be inadequate supervision and 
management of issues relating to protection of confidential or sensitive information. Thus, draft 
Article 2 now reflects an approach whereby (1) basic facts about the dispute (i.e., the identity of 
the disputing parties, the relevant economic sector, and the underlying treaty or treaties) must 
be made public shortly after the claimant issues a notice of arbitration to set a case in motion, 
but the actual notice is not subject to mandatory disclosure requirements until after the 
tribunal has been constituted. Notably, this is a departure from a number of treaty provisions 
                                                          
19 Draft Article 3, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.169, at p. 10. One issue that is not clear is why a tribunal would have to order 
disclosure of information upon the request of a party. Presumably, a party would be able to disclose information 
unilaterally if it wished, as it is currently allowed to do so under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and discussions in the 
Working Group have not suggested that the rules’ intent is to prohibit what is currently allowed.  
20 A rationale behind this approach is that the decision to make the UNCITRAL arbitration rules available to investors is a 
decision made by States at the inter-State level. Should States want to make certain aspects of the rules mandatory, they 
can. And if the rules aim to ensure transparency in investor–State dispute settlement, they should.  
21 In addition to the two issues noted below, another question that has generated much debate in the Working Group is 
the issue of how to treat non-disputing State parties to the treaty that might want to make a submission to a tribunal in an 
investor–State dispute, or from which a tribunal might request input. Due to the number of questions that issue raises 
that are not directly relevant to the issue of transparency, this paper does not cover the matter of non-disputing State 
party participation.  
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on transparency in investor–State arbitration,22 as well as from several delegations’ policies, 
and therefore does not represent “best practices” in terms of transparency. Nevertheless, this 
should not hinder states’ continued early disclosures of notices of arbitration: In some cases, 
the treaties require such disclosure and would trump any UNCITRAL rules to the contrary, and, 
even absent a treaty mandating early prompt and automatic publication of the notices of 
arbitration, the disputing parties presumably could, as they can under the 1976 and 2010 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules, continue to unilaterally or jointly decide to voluntarily release the 
notice of arbitration.23  
 
Another aspect of transparency that has met with some resistance is the issue of a flat rule for 
open hearings (subject, again, to certain exceptions). Many delegations expressed support for 
the idea of open hearings, and for preventing either or both disputing parties from having the 
power to close the proceedings; however, a number also suggested giving the tribunal the 
authority to close the hearings if it decided to do so. Thus, in contrast to the 1976 and 2010 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules in which each disputing party holds a veto power over whether to 
open hearings to non-parties, the draft transparency rules would give that veto power to the 
tribunal. Notably, like the draft provision on disclosure of notices of arbitration, this rule would 
represent a lesser degree of transparency than various countries have already committed to via 
their investment treaties, and therefore falls short of “best practices” in terms of openness.24 
 
2. Exceptions 
To balance the draft rules’ provisions on disclosure, there has been seemingly unanimous 
backing for an article specifying that the rules on transparency would be subject to exceptions 
for “protected” or “confidential or sensitive” information.25 And although, as is discussed briefly 
below, crucial questions regarding the scope and meaning of “protected, “confidential” and 
“sensitive” information remain unanswered and will continue to be subjects addressed by the 
Working Group, there has been broad recognition by delegations that they need to ensure that 
the exceptions are not allowed to swallow the transparency rules.  
  
                                                          
22 See Bernasconi & Johnson, supra n. 7, at pp. 3–4 (citing treaties that require prompt disclosure of notices of arbitration).  
23 Consistent with the idea of ensuring transparency in treaty-based investor–State arbitration, the issue of voluntary 
disclosures appears to be generally left untouched in the draft transparency rules. 
24 See Bernasconi & Johnson, supra n. 7, at pp. 7–8 (citing treaties that require open hearings).  
25 Draft Art. 8, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.169. 
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As currently proposed, the rules seem to make the parties and non-disputing parties initially 
responsible for identifying what aspects of their own submissions should be protected from 
disclosure,26 but also allow each disputing party to argue either for increased protection or 
disclosure of (1) information submitted by the other disputing party or non-disputing party, and 
(2) documents issued by the tribunal. There is no similar provision that would allow non-parties 
to contest designation of information as being covered (or not) by the exceptions.27  
 
Should a question or dispute arise regarding whether information has been appropriately 
designated as “protected” or “confidential or sensitive,” the current draft does not appear clear 
on how the issue will be resolved. In one provision, Article 8(2)(c), the draft suggests that the 
arbitral tribunal has the power to decide the issue, and should find that the information is 
shielded from disclosure under the transparency rules if it is “protected against being made 
available to the public under the law of a disputing party or any other law or rules determined 
to be applicable to the disclosure of such information by the arbitral tribunal,” a rather vague 
and open-ended standard.28 However, in another provision, Article (8)(7), the draft appears to 
call for a different, and even less disciplined approach, stating that the tribunal “shall 
determine, in the exercise of its discretion, the extent to which any information contained in 
documents which are to be made available to the public, should be redacted.”29 It is unclear 
why, if Article 8(2) attempts to set standards (albeit broad) by which to determine whether 
information is “protected” or “confidential or sensitive”, the text would also include Article 
8(7), which seems to eviscerate Article 8(2)’s standards by injecting broad discretionary 
authority for the tribunal to judge requests for withholding and redaction.30 To safeguard the 
effectiveness of and reduce uncertainty regarding the implementation of the rules, the Working 
                                                          
26 The draft rules are somewhat unclear on this point, however. Article 8(3) explains that disputing parties are to assert 
which submissions or aspects thereof they contend constitute “protected” or “confidential or sensitive” information, but, 
pursuant to Article 8(2)(c), whether information falls within the definition of “protected” or “confidential or sensitive” 
information seems to depend on a preliminary determination by the tribunal of what is the applicable law or rules 
governing the definition of “protected” or “confidential or sensitive” information. See Art. 8(2)(c) (defining “protected” 
and “confidential and sensitive” information as “information which is protected against being made available to the public 
under the law of a disputing party or any other law or rules determined to be applicable to the disclosure of such 
information by the arbitral tribunal”). 
27 Some uncertainties seem to arise from the relationship between the provision in Article 8(5), which states that each 
disputing party “may object to the proposed redaction [of any other party or non-party] and/or propose that the 
document be redacted differently,” and the current situation under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules whereby each 
disputing party and non-party such as amicus curiae may unilaterally and immediately disclose its submission without 
giving providing that opportunity for redaction. Would Article 8(5) as drafted be interpreted to restrict such unilateral 
disclosures? Could it restrict such unilateral disclosures? Does the introductory clause, “Where a redaction is proposed,” 
mean that it is only triggered in cases when the submitting party or non-party makes redactions in or claims protections 
for its submissions? If it were interpreted to restrict unilateral disclosures, could this provision be seen as one that 
hinders, rather than promotes transparency? Or does it merely give the transparency regime structure and protections?  
28 Draft Article 8(2)(c), A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.169, at p. 14. 
29 Emphasis added. The draft does give some guidance as to how the tribunal should exercise its discretion. Draft Article 
1(5) states that “[w]here these Rules provide for the arbitral tribunal to exercise discretion, the arbitral tribunal in 
exercising such discretion shall take into account, (a) the public interest in transparency in treaty-based investor–State 
arbitration and in the particular arbitral proceedings and (b) the disputing parties’ interest in a fair and efficient 
resolution of their dispute.” 
30 The draft text leaves unclear whether the tribunal can review designations sua sponte. Draft Article 8(7) states that 
“[t]he arbitral tribunal shall rule on all questions relating to the proposed redaction of documents.” (emphasis added). 
This could be read as referring solely questions that were presented to it by the disputing parties.  
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Group will need at future sessions to continue considering how to better define and constrain 
these exceptions. 
 
Another issue of creating and delineating exceptions that the Working Group has been 
considering and is still evaluating is the proposal to limit disclosure of information and access to 
hearings where necessary to protect the “integrity of the process.”31 Because that language can 
be read broadly, and may threaten to effectively eviscerate the rules on transparency, 
delegations have proposed clarifying the phrase by inserting language, now reflected in draft 
Article 8(11), noting that it only aims to encompass situations when disclosure could “hamper 
the collection or production of evidence” or “lead to the intimidation of witnesses, lawyers 
acting for the disputing parties, or members of the arbitral tribunal,” or other “comparably 
exceptional circumstances.” Overall, progress on developing the content of disclosure 
requirements, and general approaches toward exceptions, has been significant, with agreement 
forming (though not yet formally formed) around a number of proposed rules. Yet, in contrast 
to what has been rather smooth movement on the content of the rules on transparency, the 
issue of their applicability is drastically more contentious.  
B. The Applicability of Revised Arbitration Rules 
 
The applicability issue addresses whether, when and how any new provisions on transparency 
incorporated within the UNCITRAL arbitration rules can or will apply to disputes arising under 
existing and future treaties. There are a number of complementary scenarios under which 
UNCITRAL transparency rules can apply to arbitrations under existing and future treaties, and 
under arbitrations under UNCITRAL or other arbitration rules.  
 
First, the applicable treaty may give the disputing parties the ability to use any arbitration rules 
they can agree upon to govern the dispute. The bilateral investment treaty between South 
Korea and Japan, for example, states the investor may submit an investment dispute for 
settlement by binding arbitration: 
 
(a) to the Centre, if both Contracting Parties are parties to the ICSID Convention; 
(b) in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or 
(c) if agreed by both parties to the dispute, to any other arbitration institution or in 
accordance with any other arbitration rules.32 
 
When a treaty has this type of provision, the disputing parties may choose to apply the 
UNCITRAL transparency rules alongside (1) any version of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, (2) 
any other established set of arbitration rules, or (3) any ad hoc rules developed by the disputing 
parties for the dispute. Pursuant to the flexibility granted in the treaty, if the disputing parties 
choose to adopt the UNCITRAL transparency provisions, they may decide not to apply them in 
their entirety. The disputing parties, for example, may opt not to incorporate the provision 
                                                          
31 Draft Article 8(10), A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.169, at p. 15. 
32 South Korea–Japan BIT, art. 15(3) (signed March 22, 2002, entered into force January 1, 2003) (emphasis added).  
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preventing them from modifying or derogating from the transparency rules. They might also 
opt to widen the exceptions to disclosure requirements. 
 
This first scenario essentially represents the status quo. In cases when the governing treaty 
allows the parties to craft or modify the arbitration rules that will govern the dispute, then the 
disputing parties can, even at present, decide together to adopt rules on transparency. The 
UNCITRAL transparency rules, once adopted, would provide the advantage of giving the 
disputing parties a clear template and system for disclosure they could incorporate that, 
depending on the content of the rules actually adopted, may represent “best practices” in the 
area. Nevertheless, an established set of UNCITRAL transparency rules would not be necessary 
to provide for transparency in these cases where parties are free to craft their own rules; nor 
would the availability of UNCITRAL transparency rules be sufficient to ensure transparency in 
the disputes. Neither the investor nor the respondent State could unilaterally require any 
measure of transparency.  
 
Second, many of the arbitration rules currently referred to in investment treaties explicitly 
allow the disputing parties to agree to modify them. Article 1(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules states, for instance:  
 
Where the parties to a contract have agreed in writing that disputes in relation to that 
contract shall be referred to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then 
such disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such 
modification as the parties may agree in writing.33 
 
Article 1(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration rules contains a similar provision. Likewise, the 
ICSID arbitration rules provide that “[i]n the conduct of the proceeding the Tribunal shall apply 
any agreement between the parties on procedural matters, except as otherwise provided in the 
[ICSID] Convention or the Administrative and Financial Regulations.”34 
 
In accordance with these provisions in the arbitration rules, the investor and respondent State 
could agree in the context of a particular dispute to incorporate all or some of the UNCITRAL 
transparency provisions into rules governing their dispute. Thus, whereas under the first 
scenario the flexibility to incorporate the provisions is granted directly in the treaties, here it is 
granted in the arbitration rules. As under the first scenario in which the UNCITRAL transparency 
provisions could be incorporated via treaty provisions allowing the disputing parties freedom to 
craft their arbitration rules, under this second scenario the existence of UNCITRAL transparency 
rules is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure the openness of the proceedings. The 
transparency provisions, in essence, would serve as a template or guidelines from which the 
disputing parties could draw. 
 
                                                          
33 Art. 1(1). 
34 ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 20(2). 
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A third scenario in which the UNCITRAL transparency provisions could apply is if, in accordance 
with the treaty, the investor selects those rules to govern the dispute.  
 
For existing treaties, if the treaty provides that the version of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules in 
effect at the time of the dispute will apply, then, if the amended UNCITRAL arbitration rules 
with the transparency provisions are adopted, those new rules on transparency would apply in 
any case in which the investor chooses to resolve the dispute under the UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules (unless the treaty gave the disputing parties the freedom to modify the arbitration rules 
and they decided to do so by excluding all or some of the transparency provisions). Similarly, if 
a dispute were to arise under a treaty concluded after the transparency provisions are adopted 
as part of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and the investor chooses to arbitrate the dispute 
under the UNCITRAL rules, then the new provisions on transparency would likely apply unless 
the treaty provided otherwise.  
 
This third scenario differs in an important respect from those first two in that it is the only one 
that represents a significant departure from the status quo by making application of a full 
UNCITRAL transparency regime mandatory. Notably, however, application of that regime will 
only be mandatory when two conditions are met. The first condition is that the treaty—existing 
or future—must permit application of the UNCITRAL rules as amended with the transparency 
provisions.35 In other words, the State must have consented to the rules’ application. The 
second is that the investor must select those rules from the treaty’s menu of options as the 
rules that will govern the proceedings, manifesting the investor’s consent to those rules.36  
 
1. The Issue of Consent  
It is the issue of this first condition—the requirement that the treaty allow application of the 
UNCITRAL rules as amended with the transparency provisions— that is most charged in the 
Working Group. Delegations are divided on how this condition will be satisfied for existing and 
future treaties.  
 
The starting point for looking at this issue is the treaty. The terms of the treaty are fundamental 
for determining whether the new rules on transparency will apply to future disputes. Treaties 
may, for instance, provide for arbitration under:  
 
  
                                                          
35 Whether the treaty permits application of the amended arbitration rules is an issue of treaty interpretation. This is 
discussed further in this section B.1 and section B.2.  
36 This also assumes that the governing treaty did not give the disputing parties the right to modify the rules and that, if it 
did grant such a right, the disputing parties did not exercise it. 
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1. the UNCITRAL arbitration rules “in effect on the date the claim or claims were submitted 
to arbitration;”37  
2. “the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);”38 
3. a “tribunal set up from case to case in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL);”39 or 
4. the “1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”  
 
Treaties using the language of the first example appear to explicitly resolve the issue of 
applicability by stating that the version of the arbitration rules in force at the time an action is 
initiated will control. In contrast, treaties making a specific reference to the 1976 Arbitration 
Rules (or 2010 Arbitration Rules) as in the fourth example, may indicate that new amendments 
to the rules would not apply.40 Treaties using the language of the second and third example are 
more vague, but the general rule is that they would likely be interpreted as referring to the 
version of the rules in effect at the time of the commencement of the dispute.41 The principal 
rule is that treaties can allow for amendments to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules to apply to 
disputes arising under existing treaties; whether they do is an issue of treaty interpretation.  
 
Practice in treaty-based investor–State arbitrations illustrates these points. For one, similar to 
some investment treaties, the ICSID Convention specifies in Article 44 that, for disputes under 
that treaty, the version of the ICSID Arbitration Rules “in effect on the date on which the parties 
consented to arbitration will apply.” Pursuant to Article 44, changes in the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules can and have governed disputes arising under preexisting investment treaties.42  
 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) provides another relevant example. That treaty specifies that 
an investor may submit covered disputes for resolution under the ICSID Convention and ICSID 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., U.S.–Uruguay BIT (entered into force Nov. 1, 2006), Art. 24(5) (stating that the arbitration rules “in effect on 
the date the claim or claims were submitted to arbitration . . . shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified by 
this Agreement”); U.S.–Singapore FTA (entered into force Jan. 1, 2004), Art. 15.15(7) (also stating that the rules “in effect 
on the date the claim or claims were submitted to arbitration … shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified 
by this Agreement”). 
38 India–Singapore FTA, art. 6.21(3)(c). See also, e.g., China–Peru FTA, art. 139;  
39 Thailand–Argentina BIT, art. (9)(5)(b). See also , e.g., China–Netherlands BIT, art. 10(3)(b);  
40 A reference to the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules does not necessarily indicate the States’ desire to apply the rules 
in effect at that time to the exclusion of any subsequent modification. The ASEAN-Australia–New Zealand FTA (signed 
February 27, 2009), for example, states in Article 21(1)(d) that an investor may submit claims for resolution “under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.” The text defines “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” as “the arbitration rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 15 December 
1976.” The treaty then states in Article 21(3), however, that the rules “as in effect on the date the claim or claims were 
submitted to arbitration … shall govern the arbitration ….”). Moreover, if a treaty were to refer to the 2010 UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules, those rules, in turn, may arguably bring in new transparency provisions. This is because Article 1(2) of 
the 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration rules states that “parties to an arbitration agreement concluded after 15 August 2010 
shall be presumed to have referred to the Rules in effect on the date of commencement of the arbitration….” 
41 See, e.g., Jean-François Poudret, Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2007), at pp. 80–81 
(discussing applicability of amended arbitration rules). 
42 See, e.g., AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 (applying the 2006 ICSID 
arbitration rules, including their provisions on amicus curiae, to the dispute). 
 15 
Arbitration Rules, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or the 
rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC). It does not 
specify which version of the rules will apply. Yet each of those sets of rules have been amended 
at least once since the ECT has come into effect, and the amended versions of each of those 
sets of rules have applied to arbitrations against States that were party to the treaty before the 
rules’ amendments were adopted. 
 
More specifically, disputes have applied the 2006 ICSID arbitration rules even when the 2006 
amendments post-dated the respondent State’s signature and ratification of the ECT.43 
Similarly, the SCC rules have been revised three times since 1999; and the most recent versions 
of the rules in effect at the time the ECT arbitrations were commenced have been used to 
govern those disputes irrespective of whether the amendments were adopted after the 
respondent State had signed or ratified the ECT.44 Likewise, the 2010 UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules have been applied to ECT arbitrations even though the respondent States were party to 
the ECT before the 2010 amendments were adopted.45  
 
2. The Working Group’s Treatment of Consent for Existing Treaties 
Accepting that there is nothing inherent in treaty-based investor–State arbitration that 
prevents amendments to procedural rules from applying to disputes arising under existing 
treaties, it is important to turn to some of the proposals in the Working Group regarding the 
issue of application. Notably, some draft language explicitly seeks to preclude what the treaties 
would allow; thus, although an existing treaty may permit the amendments to apply, the rules 
themselves would narrow their scope of application. 
  
                                                          
43 See Europe Cement Investment & Trade v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/2, Award, Aug. 13, 2009, 
para. 11 (noting agreement that the Additional Facility “Rules in effect on 10 April 2006 would apply”); Cementownia 
‘Nowa Huta’ S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/06/2, Award, Sept. 17, 2007, para. 32 (noting that “it was 
agreed that the Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules in effect as of April 10, 2006 apply to the proceedings”). Disputes 
under other treaties that, like the ECT, use a general reference to the arbitration rules, have also been settled under the 
amended ICSID arbitration and additional facility rules. Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, is a 
notable example. It arose under the 1997 Italy–South Africa BIT and the 1998 Belgium–Luxembourg –South Africa BIT, 
and was settled under the 2006 ICSID Additional Facility Rules, which included language on amicus curiae that the 
previous Additional Facility Rules had not. The fact that those new rules applied was significant because amicus curiae 
were in fact an issue in the case.  
44 See, e.g., Mohammad Anmar Al-Bahloul v. Republic of Tajikistan, SCC Arbitration No. V (064/2008), para. 38. Tajikistan 
signed the ECT in 1994, and ratified it in 1997. The treaty entered into force in 1998. This case was brought in 2008, and 
the award was issued in 2010. In the award, the tribunal applied the 2007 arbitration rules rather than prior versions. 
The differences among the relevant provisions are not insignificant. For example, the tribunal relied Article 26(1) of the 
2007 SCC arbitration rules for the proposition that it had the authority to determine the “admissibility, relevance, 
materiality and weight of evidence.” In contrast, the 1999 SCC arbitration rules did not give the tribunal that power. 
Rather, Article 26(1) merely stated that the parties were required to “state the evidence on which they intend to rely, 
specifying what they intend to prove with each item of evidence, and present the documentary evidence on which they 
rely.” The tribunal also applied the 2007 SCC arbitration rules on costs, which also differed notably from earlier versions 
of the rules.  
45 See, e.g., Khan Resources Inc. v. Gov’t of Mongolia, Notice of Arbitration (Jan. 10, 2011), para. 12. The 2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules have also been used in disputes under other treaties that use a general reference to the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules without specifying the particular version that will apply. See, e.g., Guaracachi America, Inc. v. 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA406. 
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More specifically, proposed text that will be under consideration in the October 2012 Working 
Group session states the following: 
 
These Rules shall apply to investor–State arbitration initiated pursuant to a treaty 
providing for the protection of investments or investors (“treaty”)* when the Parties to 
the treaty [or all parties to the arbitration (the “disputing parties”)] have agreed to their 
application.46  
 
The requirement that the State parties to the treaty “have agreed to” the rules’ application 
could be read as including implicit agreement (e.g., through a treaty allowing for dynamic 
interpretation47 and application of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules). Discussions during the 
Working Group and the explanatory note to the UNCITRAL Secretariat’s text, however, make 
clear that the language is intended to preclude the possibility of a dynamic interpretation. 48 
Under this language, therefore, an existing treaty would have to expressly refer to the as yet 
non-existent transparency provisions in order for them to be part of the treaty’s menu of rules 
available to investors. 
 
This approach would have extremely significant implications for the task of ensuring 
transparency in investor–State arbitration. This is because there are some 3,000 existing 
treaties, and it is under these treaties that investor–State disputes are going to arise for years 
to come. If the Working Group hinders application of the UNCITRAL transparency rules in these 
disputes, the rules will rarely, if ever, apply.49  
 
Notably, this approach reflects a policy choice, not an approach required by law. It therefore 
prompts the question of whether the Working Group—which the Commission has directed to 
develop a legal standard that would “ensure transparency in investor–State arbitration” —is 
undermining that mandate.  
 
Some country delegations, however, have protested what appears to be the prevailing 
direction of the Working Group and are not ready to accept the language reflected in the 
Secretariat’s draft. These delegations are comfortable with—if not supportive of—the 
possibility that a dynamic interpretation of a reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules could 
result in new rules on transparency being applied in disputes arising under existing treaties. 
They have noted that changes to the UNCITRAL rules have long been anticipated,50 and that 
                                                          
46 Draft Article 1(1), A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.172, at p. 3 (emphasis added). 
47 A “dynamic interpretation” of an investment treaty’s reference to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules is one in which the 
treaty is interpreted to provide for the application of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules as they might evolve over time. 
48 See, e.g., A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.172, at p. 4, para. 9.  
49 Disputing parties could agree to apply the rules, but in such cases the rules would operate more as voluntary guidelines 
rather than “rules” on transparency.  
50
 See, e.g., 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Model Arbitration Clause (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of 
or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance 
with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as at present in force.” (emphasis added)). See also Jan Paulsson & Georgios 
Petrochilos, Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2006), at p. 1, available at 
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when drafting their treaties they had wanted to allow for such changes and updates to ensure 
that the most modern set of rules governed their disputes.  
 
Some of these countries, namely Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, 
and the United States, have made a joint counter-proposal to the draft text in the Secretariat’s 
note. These governments outlined the reasoning behind their position:51 
 
1. The Commission, at its forty-fourth and forty-fifth sessions, reaffirmed its commitment 
regarding the importance of ensuring transparency in treaty-based investor–State 
arbitration. 
2. To be effective in promoting transparency, it is essential to consider the investment 
treaties currently in force internationally. 
3. Application of the rules on transparency under an existing investment treaty is subject 
to the agreement of the Parties to that treaty.  
4. In most cases, it will be clear if an existing treaty did not envision the application of the 
rules on transparency, and where it is not clear, the Parties to the treaty can take steps 
to prevent such application if they so desire.  
5. However, those who do not wish the rules on transparency to apply under their treaties 
should not attempt to compel a similar result in cases where others desire the rules on 
transparency to apply under their own treaties and the language of the treaties provides 
for such application. To suggest otherwise would be unfair and not in keeping with the 
mandate from the Commission.  
6. Moreover, the rules on transparency cannot purport to establish rules of treaty 
interpretation, which are governed by international law, including the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.52  
 
The language these countries have proposed to address the issue of applicability to existing 
treaties reads:  
 
If a treaty concluded prior to [date of adoption/effective date of the Rules on 
Transparency] refers to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that reference means the 
version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that incorporates these Rules on 
Transparency if the treaty, as interpreted in accordance with international law, reflects 
the treaty Parties’ agreement to the application of that version of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.53  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/arbrules_report.pdf (stating, in a report commissioned by UNCITRAL in 
advance of work leading to the 2010 revisions, that revision of the UNCITRAL Rules was “clearly envisaged in 1976”).  
51 The countries that have made this proposal have made their position public. In contrast, the countries that are resisting 
application of the transparency rules to existing treaties have not yet been as open about their positions. 
52 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.174, at pp. 3-4. Internal footnotes omitted. 
53 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.174, at p. 4. 
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This text incorporates the settled rule that the treaty, as interpreted under international law, 
will determine which version of the rules will apply. It would leave open the possibility of, but 
would not require, a dynamic interpretation of general references to the “UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.” If parties to a treaty-based investor–State dispute were to disagree about which version 
of the rules would apply, the tribunal will resolve that dispute based on applicable rules of 
treaty interpretation. As noted below, State parties to the governing treaty can make that task 
easier for the tribunal (or prevent such disputes from arising) by issuing interpretive statements 
or taking other steps to promote or prevent the rules’ application.  
 
3. Clarifying the Scope of Consent for Existing Treaties: The role of interpretive declarations 
If a treaty does not clearly require or preclude a dynamic interpretation, there are various 
avenues through which States could seek to promote or prevent application of the 
transparency rules in the context of a particular investor–State dispute or before one arises. 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties54 (VCLT) and the International Law Commission’s 
(ILC) Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties55 (the “ILC Guide”) provide guidance.  
 
Article 31 of the VCLT addresses the issue of treaty interpretation. Its subparagraph (3) requires 
that treaty interpretation take into account “subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “subsequent 
practice” in the treaty parties’ application of the treaty which establishes their agreement as to 
its meaning. Such agreements and practice can take various forms: 
 
The agreement need not be in binding or treaty form but must demonstrate that the 
parties intended their understanding to constitute an agreed basis for interpretation. 
Such agreements may be more or less formal, ranging from a jointly signed document to 
a series of acts or communications from which an agreement can be inferred. The more 
informal the basis, the greater the overlap with subsequent practice . . . . tribunals look 
for a “concordant, common and consistent” sequence of acts or pronouncements about 
a treaty that “is sufficient to establish a discernible pattern implying the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation.” Subsequent practice may include executive, 
legislative, and judicial acts. It can be between the parties or internal within one party, 
provided that it is known by the other parties. Not every treaty party has to have 
engaged in a common practice, so long as all assent or acquiesce to it.56 
 
Through the role the VCLT carves out for States to influence the interpretation of their treaties, 
and the measure of flexibility it gives them in terms of how to reach “agreement” or establish 
the “practice” that must be taken into account by arbitral tribunals, the VCLT provides 
                                                          
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 31. 
55 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two. This report was adopted by the ILC at its sixty-
third session, in 2011, and submitted to the General Assembly. 
56 Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 
199–200 (2010) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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opportunities for States to promote or contest dynamic interpretations of their references to 
the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.57  
 
  
                                                          
57 See id. 
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The ILC Guide addresses a more specific issue relevant to interpretation—namely, the role of 
interpretative declarations. The Guide defines an “interpretative declaration” as a “unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization, 
whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a 
treaty or of certain of its positions.”58 “An interpretive declaration does not modify treaty 
obligations.”59 Rather, it “may only specify or clarify the meaning or scope which its author 
attributes to” all or part of a treaty “and may, as appropriate, constitute an element to be taken 
into account in interpreting the treaty in accordance with the general rule of interpretation of 
treaties.”60  
 
In terms of procedure, an interpretive declaration can be made at any time,61 should 
“preferably be formulated in writing,”62 and by “a person who is considered as representing a 
State . . . for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty or expressing the 
consent of the State . . . to be bound by a treaty.”63 It should also be appropriately 
communicated to the other treaty party or parties.64 
 
The other treaty party or parties can explicitly approve or oppose the interpretive declaration, 
or can remain silent. If an interpretive declaration is made by one party to a bilateral treaty, and 
accepted by the other party to the treaty, the resulting interpretation “constitutes an authentic 
interpretation of the treaty.”65 Similarly, “an interpretive declaration that has been approved by 
all the contracting States . . . may constitute an agreement regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty.”66 Approval must be manifested—it cannot be inferred from mere silence.67  
 
Based on these principles, the Working Group can formulate model interpretive declarations 
for States to assert how references in investment treaties to UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules should 
be understood.68 States could either assert that the rules at the time of the commencement of 
the dispute or at the time the treaty was concluded or any other set of UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules apply. Text could state, for example: 
  
                                                          
58 Para. 1.2 
59 Para. 4.7.1. 
60 Para. 4.7.1.  
61 The treaty may modify this general rule. Para. 2.4.4. 
62 Para. 2.4.1. 
63 Para. 2.4.2. 
64 Para. 2.4.5; see also Arts. 2.1.5, 2.1.6, and 2.1.7. 
65 Para. 1.6.3. 
66 Para. 4.7.3. 
67 Para. 2.9.9 
68 In some instances, unilateral interpretive declarations have been viewed with skepticism. Yet the skepticism has 
usually emerged in situations where the State asserting the interpretation did so (1) while a dispute regarding the treaty 
or provision was ongoing, and (2) in order to assert a narrow reading of a (3) substantive obligation. Thus, declarations 
made in advance of and untied to a particular dispute, involving the assumption of a commitment (i.e., a commitment to 
transparency) and relating to issues of procedure, rather than substance, are distinguishable, and should not raise the 
same concerns.  
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For greater certainty, the reference in the [name of the specific treaty] [investment 
treaties concluded by that include the option of investor–State arbitration] to the 
“UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” means the version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as in 
force at the time the dispute is commenced. 
 
4. The Default Rule for Future Treaties 
With respect to future treaties, delegations fall into what have been called the “opt-in” and 
“opt-out” camps. The general “opt-out” position is that, once provisions on transparency are 
integrated within the UNCITRAL arbitration rules (but with provisions limiting their application 
to investor–State disputes), references to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules in treaties concluded 
after the transparency provisions are adopted would thereby bring in those rules on 
transparency, unless countries specified otherwise (or “opted out” of the transparency rules) in 
their treaties. States could do this, for example, by referring in their treaties to versions of the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules that do not contain transparency provisions (e.g., the 1976 and 2010 
arbitration rules),69 or by stating explicitly that they do not want the rules on transparency to 
apply.  
 
In contrast, the “opt-in” advocates argue that, if and when new rules on transparency are 
concluded, they should contain a limiting provision making clear that they will only apply to 
disputes if the State parties to the governing treaty have specifically “opted into” the 
transparency provisions in addition to the general arbitration rules that may apply. In other 
words, a simple reference to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules would not bring along the 
UNCITRAL rules on transparency. A treaty would have to explicitly refer to the UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules (and/or other arbitration rules) and the UNCITRAL rules on transparency for 
the transparency rules to apply. Thus, the rules on transparency would effectively function as a 
stand-alone instrument, not as an integral aspect of an amended version of the UNCITRAL rules.  
 
At the early Working Group II sessions on the issue of transparency, a large contingent of 
countries supported the “opt-in” approach for future treaties, arguing that this would ensure 
that States had clearly consented to the application of new rules on transparency. However, as 
the “opt-out” proponents responded, even under the “opt-out” approach, State consent would 
be required. It would simply be manifested differently: Provided the rules on transparency were 
integrated within the general UNCITRAL arbitration rules, States would give their consent to the 
transparency provisions by including the UNCITRAL arbitration rules in their treaties, similar to 
how States would be deemed to have consented to other provisions contained in the UNCITRAL 
rules. The “opt-out” approach would make transparency the default rule for UNCITRAL 
arbitrations under future treaties, but States could restrict or bar application of all or some of 
the transparency provisions if they so choose.  
 
                                                          
69 But see supra, n. 41. 
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Those two points—one, that consent would still be required under the “opt-out” approach, and 
two, that the “opt-out” approach, which makes transparency the default rule, is more 
consistent with the aim of ensuring transparency in investor–State arbitrations—have led some 
former proponents of the “opt-in” path to indicate they would accept the “opt-out” approach. 
Consequently, the article reflected in the Secretariat’s draft incorporates an “opt-out” 
presumption for future treaties. Yet critically, some of those delegations that expressed support 
for the “opt-out” approach for future treaties have made clear that their switch is tentative, 
and conditional upon their ability to narrow the rules and limit their application under existing 
treaties.  
 
C. Other “Creative Solutions” or Mechanisms for Expanding the Rules’  
     Application 
Amendment of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules to incorporate provisions requiring openness of 
the proceedings, and to facilitate wide application of those rules (consistent with international 
law), will bring the UN’s rules in line with trends evidenced by ICSID, and will also finally bring 
them into alignment with principles of transparency, good governance, and accountability 
advanced throughout the UN system.  
 
Yet, as noted to above, even if the UNCITRAL arbitration rules are revised to contain 
comprehensive rules on transparency, and even if the rules enable application to disputes 
under existing treaties, there are limits to when the full suite of the rules will apply. First, the 
treaty will have to allow it; and second, the investor will have to select those rules from the 
treaty’s menu. Only when those two conditions are met will there be mandatory application of 
the package of rules. Pursuant to the flexibilities that are provided to investors to select the 
rules that will govern disputes, and to disputing parties to shape their own rules, many options 
will remain for investor–State arbitration to proceed behind closed doors.70  
 
Thus, in addition to revising the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, States and the Working Group 
should consider options for broadening their application through use of “creative solutions.” 
When consistent with the treaty, States can, for example, unilaterally declare their consent to 
apply the revised rules on transparency to investor–State disputes, and ask investors to likewise 
consent. Thus, pursuant to provisions in treaties or applicable arbitration rules that give 
disputing parties flexibility to select the rules of procedure that will govern a particular dispute, 
a State can offer advance consent to apply the UNCITRAL transparency rules. The NAFTA parties 
used this approach in 2003 to provide for open hearings. The Government of Canada, for 
example, stated: 
 
Having reviewed the operation of arbitration proceedings conducted under Chapter Eleven of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada affirms that it will consent, and will request 
the consent of disputing investors and, as applicable, tribunals, that hearings in Chapter Eleven 
                                                          
70 Though this practice may conflict with international and domestic law on access to information. 
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disputes to which it is a party be open to the public, except to ensure the protection of 
confidential information, including business confidential information. Canada recommends that 
tribunals determine the appropriate logistical arrangements for open hearings in consultation 
with disputing parties. These arrangements may include, for example, use of closed-circuit 
television systems, Internet webcasting, or other forms of access.71 
 
Mexico and the United States have made similar declarations.72 
 
Another option would be for States to conclude a separate agreement in which they commit to 
apply the revised rules on transparency in future investor–State disputes applying UNCITRAL or 
other arbitration rules. This document could be open for signature (or other means of 
establishing consent to be bound) by other States, and could contribute to gradual expanded 
implementation of the transparency rules.73 Pursuant to Article 30 of the VCLT, this new 
agreement’s provisions on transparency in investor–State dispute settlement could control and 
modify relevant provisions in existing investment treaties where the State parties to the 
investment treaties were also parties to the transparency convention. 
 
Such a convention could be a viable and important long-term strategy for increasing 
transparency of investor–State arbitrations and widening application of UNCITRAL’s new 
transparency rules. If and when drafted, and widely signed and ratified, it would complement 
the work that the Working Group can accomplish in the near term through revision of the 
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Efforts on such a convention, however, can be complementary to 
and need not displace the current undertaking to make UNCITRAL arbitrations more 
transparent.  
  
                                                          
71 Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, October 7, 2003. 
72 NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement: A Decade of Achievement, July 16, 2004. 
73 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 30. 
Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter  
 
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States Parties to 
successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the following 
paragraphs.  
  
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or 
later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.  
  
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its 
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.  
  
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:  
  
(a) as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;  
  
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both 




To comply with the Commission’s mandate to ensure transparency in investor–State arbitration 
requires two things: one is the development of procedural rules that require regular, automatic 
and prompt disclosure of initiation of arbitrations, documents submitted to tribunals, orders, 
decisions and awards issued by tribunals, and open hearings and/or published transcripts. The 
other is ensuring that those procedural rules on transparency have the widest possible 
application in investor–State disputes arising under existing and future treaties. The Working 
Group has made significant progress on the first element of transparency, i.e., defining the 
rules’ form and content, though there are some areas where it currently seems to be falling 
short of adopting “best practice” standards. With respect to the second issue, i.e., the issue of 
applicability of the transparency rules, there remains a risk that the Working Group will block 
the extension the scope of application of the transparency rules to disputes under existing 
investment treaties. Such a development would reflect a policy choice, not a legally mandated 
outcome, and would fall short of fulfilling the mandate of the Commission and the United 
Nations more generally to ensure and promote transparency.  
 
